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Abstract 
This paper investigates Italy's position on global climate change politics in order to explore the larger question of 
why this country, like similar middle powers, may adopt ambiguous positions on global public policy issues. I start 
from the observation that in recent history Italy has taken a rather mild position on international climate cooper-
ation and climate policy more broadly. To explain this, I propose an argument in divergence with those who claim 
Italy has low salience in the issue or lack of interest in international climate leadership. I put forward a political 
economy perspective and claim that different salient concerns motivate the domestic actors that shape the 
country’s international position. I maintain that these different concerns offset each other, resulting in overall mild 
preferences. I present support for my theory, zooming in on the motivations of two domestic sources of interna-
tional positions: economic sectors and public opinion. The empirical data largely corroborates the theory.   
1. Introduction 
he international relations literature classically studies the global policy preferences 
of very powerful nations (Krasner 1991) or, alternately, of states with extreme policy 
positions (Keohane 1971). However, international cooperation is rarely dictated 
only by hegemons or outliers. International policy is commonly centered on the preferences 
of middle powers (Milner 1997; Alesina, Angeloni and Etro 2005), especially when the de-
bate pivots on public good issues where the benefits of action are diffused. Yet, the positions 
of these countries remain largely understudied. This is presumably because they are as-
sumed to have relatively low salience for the issues at hand, and, therefore, little motivation 
behind the matter of discussion at international organizations. But is it true that middle 
power countries – i.e. sovereign states that are neither negligible nor a superpower – tend to 
adopt mild positions on global public policy issues? If so, why? 
This paper argues that the international positions of such middle powers are indeed 
often modest. However, and in contrast with other views, I claim that this is not neces-
sarily due to the low salience of international issues. Rather, I argue that these positions 
are more likely due to the way salient drivers of national positions neutralize each other. I 
focus my argument on one specific issue of international cooperation, climate change, 
which is an increasingly major focus of foreign affairs. I maintain that international po-
sitions on climate change mitigation and adaptation are drawn on important factors at 
the foundations of states’ domestic political economy. In the case of certain countries, 
these factors tend to offset each other and hence lead to ‘mild’ international positions. 
T 
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I look at Italy as an example of such positioning on international climate cooperation. 
Italy is an interesting geographical case, for it is a clear example of mid-sized power in the 
modern international world. It is currently neither too influential nor too trivial in most 
international organizations, and it is generally important though not crucial in 
institutions such as the European Union. With respect to international climate politics, 
the Italian case is relevant because the country is in the middle of the global spectrum of 
environmental progress. In 2015, 16% of the country’s total energy consumption came 
from renewable energy1, just one percentage less than the EU average. However, fossil 
fuel demand and subsidies are still significant.2 Along these lines, Italian politicians have 
been on the fence in terms of embracing UNFCCC targets and proposals (De Blasio, 
Hibberd and Sorice 2013). So, altogether, Italy is a country with a climate action position 
which is neither too bleak nor too ambitious.  
I empirically show how domestic motivations in Italy have offset each other and 
therefore diluted the country’s international positions on issues related to climate 
change. For practical reasons, I concentrate on two domestic factors of climate policy 
largely discussed in the political economy literature: industrial sectors and public 
opinion. I present evidence that, for both industries and the public opinion realm, 
political ambition and economic constraints counterbalance a predisposition for deep 
climate cooperation. This, I argue, explains why countries like Italy have only taken ‘mild’ 
positions on climate change action. 
The findings have implications that go beyond the study of Italy or climate change per 
se. The paper’s main insight into international politics is that, for mid-sized countries that 
have domestic contentions (like Italy), positions on pressing global issues can be lukewarm 
due to the fact that opportunities and costs nullify each other. This suggests that it is not 
lack of salience, but rather the neutralization of multidimensional domestic concerns that 
explains foreign affairs in middle powers.  More generally, the paper contributes to the 
knowledge on international organizations and cooperation. Middle powers’ positions are 
often close to decision-making outcomes in bargaining contexts with a unanimity vote, 
which is the rule adopted by the United Nations and other bodies of international govern-
ance (e.g. the Council of the European Union). By shedding light on the motivations of 
middle powers and the mixed forms of salience they attach to international issues in these 
institutions, the paper provides food for thought for understanding the often-neglected 
driving forces (and hurdles) of international cooperation. 
2. Theory: the roots of mild positions on climate action and 
Italy’s international climate policy 
The global climate is a collective public good that requires coordinated international ef-
forts. A growing literature discusses the external reasons why countries take positions 
on international climate policy. Some point to competitive peer pressure and 
 
1 Legambiente. 2016. ‘Rapporto Comuni Rinnovabili 2015’ http://www.comunirinnovabili.it/il-rap-
porto-comuni-rinnovabili-2015/ 
2 Support for fossil fuel consumption is slightly below the median OECD rate, although it has risen sharply 
since 2012. See Climate Transparency. 2017. ‘Brown to Green. The G20 Transition to a Low-Carbon 
Economy: Italy’. https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/B2G2017-It-
aly.pdf. 
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transnational norm diffusion (Dechezleprêtre, Neumayer and Perkins 2015; Fan-
khauser, Gennaioli and Collins 2016). Others mention the role of alliances and joint 
membership in international clubs (Keohane and Victor 2011; Hovi et al. 2019). Much of 
this literature finds a vital role played by countries with high salience in the focal issue of 
international discussion. Often, these countries are equated to major economies (John-
son and Urpelainen 2019) or issue-relevant coalitions (Genovese 2020). 
This literature, however, tends to ignore the role of internal contentions and the way 
governments need to balance domestic disagreements. Differently from structural 
perspectives in the international relations literature, this paper takes a political economy 
view to explore the domestic politics behind international climate positions (Bayer and 
Urpelainen 2016; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Newell 2019). A domestic political 
economy perspective is relevant, for it can shed more light on the distributive concerns 
that motivate climate positions in countries that are neither materially nor morally 
indispensable to international cooperation. In other words, a domestic political economy 
analysis can provide insights into the motivations of countries that are otherwise 
assumed to have medium salience in international cooperation.3 
Evidently, there are many moving elements in the domestic political economy of any 
country. Here I focus on two specific factors: industries (as in, economic sectors and their 
respective businesses) and public opinion. Many studies show that these both shape 
preferences for international policy (for a comprehensive review, see Bernauer 2013). 
Recent climate politics research has also shown their complementarity (Mahlotra, 
Monin and Tomz 2019). I argue that in most countries both of these sources of national 
positions attach salience to international climate policy. However, in many countries 
each of them is respectively pulled by different motivations. If the motivations are 
contradictory, business and public opinion will not have a coherent effect on national 
positions on the climate. Consequently, under mixed internal incentives national 
governments will more likely settle on timid international positions on climate policy. I 
claim these dynamics are observable in the Italian case, as per below. 
With respect to industries, I expect that economic businesses are confronted with a 
basic ‘trade-environment’ friction, according to which unconstrained trade is a propeller 
of profits and innovation, while the environment is a source of costs (Aklin 2014). Along 
these lines, two fundamental dimensions in which businesses contend their power are 
environmental effectiveness and economic constraints (the latter intended here through 
the lenses of free trade). Depending on how these two dimensions intersect, businesses 
may win or lose from international climate regulations, and therefore keep their 
governments accountable to a particular international position.  
Companies that are both environmentally efficient (i.e., clean) and economically 
unconstrained (i.e., exposed to international trade) tend to be the winners of climate 
regulations (Meckling 2015; Genovese 2019). These businesses have incentives to lobby 
for meaningful climate cooperation because they are more likely to profit from it. 
 
3 To be sure, it is plausible that the domestic political economy of a country is shaped by international 
phenomena and institutions. In the case of Italy, it is equally plausible that the nation’s economic and 
political preferences are the result of coordination among other European countries. While I do not ex-
clude the EU influence on Italian climate policy stands, I remain agnostic of this effect in this paper. 
Instead, to avoid measuring on EU-level positions, I try to trace data that is as nationally focused, i.e. not-
EU dependent, as far as possible. 
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Consequently, countries with a high density of these ‘climate champions’ should have 
rather uncontroversial, clear-cut positive attitudes towards deep climate cooperation. 
Vice versa, if an economic sector is both environmentally inefficient and economically 
profiting from unconstrained free trade, businesses regard international climate policy 
as a hurdle, because of the scale of adjustment this requires. Consequently, countries with 
a high density of these ‘climate laggards’ should be clearly resentful of climate 
cooperation (Genovese 2019). 
Evidently, these two types of businesses may not be the most common ones. If 
environmental ambition and economic constraints are somewhat mixed, the country’s 
position would also fall in between. In the case of Italy, I expect to observe several 
industrial sectors and businesses with such mixed motivations: some globally trading 
industries that are inefficient in terms of greenhouse gas contribution and, vice versa, 
some industrial sectors that are environmentally sustainable but not fully scaled up on 
international trade. This contention is one possible way to reconcile the country’s 
willingness to be both an economic leader and an environmentally responsible actor at 
international organizations (Padovani 2010).4  
With respect to public opinion, a similar environment-economics nexus can be 
expected to be at work and, thus, put similar pressure on the national government. On the 
one hand, the average citizen in virtually any country should appreciate environmental 
sustainability – either because of its intrinsic value or its relevance for economic 
livelihood (Kolstad 2014). On the other hand, economic constraints due to the easiness of 
diverting material resources and investing funds in the environment should affect 
citizens’ positions on climate. Amongst financially resourceful people that place a lot of 
value on the environment, ambitious climate policy should be a clear, positive opinion. 
Vice versa, amongst poor people with little attachment to the environment, climate policy 
would be a second-order consideration at best. But if these two considerations are mixed, 
public opinion should also be torn. 
This mixed opinion on international climate policy is what I expect to observe 
amongst the Italian public. Italy is a country with many natural resources and several 
nature-dependent industries (agriculture, but also tourism, which in 2019 corresponded 
to 13 percent of the Italian GDP). Also, one third of Italians in 2018 lived outside of cities, 
in direct contact with natural land (Romano et al 2017). Also, a large number of jobs are 
sensitive to a functional natural environment, either because of their vulnerability to the 
integrity of the ecosystem (Egan and Mullin 2011) or because of the direct link between 
job concerns and preferences for climate policy (Bechtel, Genovese and Scheve 2019). In 
light of these considerations, it is reasonable to expect the average Italian to attach 
significant saliency to the issue of climate policy.  
At the same time, Italy is a financially constrained country with little wiggle room for 
investments outside of core economic areas. Especially since the recent financial crisis, a 
great deal of climate policy discussion in Italy – and other Southern European countries – 
has focused on the (in)capacity to ramp up current standards of climate action (McCrigh, 
Dunlap and Marquatt-Pyatt 2016). We know from other public opinion research that this 
 
4 In the paper I exchange the use of words ‘businesses’ and ‘sectors’, assuming that the latter are an ag-
gregation of the former (Genovese 2019). In the interest of space, I limit my attention to some selected 
sectors. As I show later in the empirics, I focus on agriculture and mining. 
FEDERICA GENOVESE 
 5 
type of material consideration is very effective in taming preferences for climate cooper-
ation (Bechtel and Scheve 2013). Along these lines, Italy’s austerity-minded technocratic 
governments in 2011-12 contributed to people believing that the EU should not increase 
its emissions reduction target for 2020 beyond the existing 20% (Skovgaard 2014). This 
insight suggests that Italy’s public opinion should be split between the political interest to 
act on climate and economic concerns related to the capacity to act on climate. I expect 
these considerations to co-exist and to be equally meaningful, hence justifying why coun-
tries like Italy remain mildly interested in pushing for bold international climate 
positions and cooperation. 
3. Empirical evidence 
In broad terms, my theoretical argument suggests that competing political economy mo-
tivations can drive climate policy preferences in directions, diluting each other and 
essentially settling countries on ‘mild’ international different climate positions. In what 
follows I show empirical evidence in support of this mixed incentives argument.  
First, I focus on the interests of some selected Italian economic sectors. Combining de-
scriptive and comparative data, I show how the burden of pollution abatement and the 
benefit of trade openness offset their respective effect on the country’s international cli-
mate positions. Second, I concentrate on the mixed interests in Italy’s public opinion; 
employing a regression analysis, I show how interests in climate politics and concerns with 
economic capacity have counterbalancing effects on individuals’ preferences for climate 
policy. Inevitably, the observational data underlying these analyses is imperfect. For exam-
ple, the first empirical analysis of sectors is based on data covering the years between 2001 
and 2011, while the second analysis on public opinion covers more recent years (2017 and 
2019). Despite the limitations due to data availability, I maintain that the evidence offered 
below indicates patterns that go in the direction of my theoretical argument. 
3.1 Mixed motivations in industrial sectors 
With respect to industrial sectors (i.e. businesses), the testable hypothesis derived from 
my theory is that ambition for environmental leadership pulls companies in one direction 
while economic opportunities (or constraints) dictated by free trade pull in the other 
direction. Only if an economic sector is both environmentally efficient and oriented 
towards free trade can it then be considered a winner of international climate 
coordination. Vice versa, if a sector is both environmentally inefficient (i.e., pollution 
intensive) and oriented towards free trade, then it would suffer the most from credible 
climate regulation. If an economic sector falls in between these categories, then it sits in 
between climate leadership and opposition, and so the governments they lobby. 
To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis for Italy, I require specific measures. For the 
outcome variable, I need a systematic estimate of its international climate positions. For 
the explanatory variables, I need measurements of sectors’ trade openness and 
environmental performance. For both I use here a dataset presented in Genovese (2019). 
The data was constructed to compare the causes and consequences of countries’ positions 
at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the 
interest of space, I focus on two sectors: agriculture and mining. 
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With regards to the outcome variable, I rely on the aggregated scores of countries’ 
positions in Genovese (2014; 2019). These are based on the National Communications that 
national governments periodically submit to the UNFCCC. The issue-specific positions 
from the National Communications were collected with a careful qualitative coding 
exercise for two periods of the climate negotiations, namely the meetings before the Kyoto 
Protocol’s entry into force (2001–2004) and the post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations (2008–
2011). The data coding followed a measurement procedure in which governments’ 
positions were coded for most national governments (115 countries). Although the data are 
originally coded at the issue level, I estimate preferences for a broadly defined measure of 
global climate cooperation using an aggregated score calculated with a factor analysis.  
Table 1. Comparison of national positions on climate cooperation at the UNFCCC, 2001-2004 and 
2009-2011. 
 
Notes: the dot plots illustrate the distribution of the country scores calculated with the factor analysis of the National Communi-
cations coded in Genovese (2019). The country scores go from less cooperative on the left to more cooperative on the right. 
Dots closer to the zero empirical mean (on the x-axis) are interpreted as scores for more moderate positions. The Italian score is 
highlighted in red for each of the two respective UNFCCC periods. 
Figure 1 reports the country means of the main factor scores for each of the two peri-
ods covered in the dataset. The red line highlights the relevant estimates for Italy. The 
figure clearly shows what I assumed at the beginning of this paper: Italy has historically 
maintained a relatively modest position at UNFCCC negotiations. One could say it is ‘spa-
tially’ located in the middle of the cross-national distribution. A close look indicates that 
Italy’s score is in the neighborhood of other developed countries. These cluster at the top 
right of the scale, which can be interpreted as the more ‘cooperative’ side of the 
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distribution. Still, Italy is next to well-known hawkish countries like the United States. 
Also, if one were to account for confidence intervals (not reported here for simplicity), 
these would show that Italy’s position is indistinguishable from zero. 
Following the theory, one way to think about the roots of Italy’s UNFCCC position is 
by looking at how its industrial lobbies -- i.e., its sectors -- score in terms of pollution costs 
and trade openness. Presumably, I would find a mixed scenario to explain the mild 
UNFCCC positions. For example, some of Italy’s more trade-exposed sectors are only 
partially sustainable, and vice versa where the more environmentally efficient sectors are 
not necessarily very trade dependent. To elucidate how Italian sectors score on these two 
dimensions, I follow Genovese (2019) and I employ two indicators. To capture pollution 
costs, I resort to sector-specific GHG volumes, which are million tons of CO2-equivalent 
emissions divided by the total CO2-equivalent emissions of the country. Contrastingly, to 
capture trade opportunities, I use trade openness, which is calculated as the sum of exports 
and imports divided by GDP generated by each sector.5 
Figures 2 and 3 show how two main sectors – namely, agriculture and mining – fare 
with respect to these two measurements. The specific measurements for Italy are 
highlighted with the red arrow.  
With respect to agriculture (Figure 2), it is evident that Italy is relatively efficient: 
this sector contributes to less than a tenth of the national greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (around 7%). However, this sector is only partly involved in international trade 
compared to major European traders like the Netherlands and Denmark and a large 
number of developing countries (in Italy in 2016, agriculture accounted for 6% of all 
exports, contrarily to the average European agricultural sector that accounts for 10% 
export). The snapshot in Figure 2 provides some illustrative support to the intuition of 
my argument: the efficiency of Italian farming can enjoy the benefits of stricter 
international climate regulation, but it is not maximized by trade. This mixed scenario 
is in line with the narrative that Italy has been supportive of cooperation in some 
farming-related UNFCCC issues (e.g., accounting efforts of mitigation through land and 
forestry projects in developing countries), but has not made this a priority either within 
European Union talks or at international climate negotiations (Padovani 2010). 
The data regarding the mining sector (Figure 3) are flipped, but essentially lead to a 
similar conclusion on how pollution concerns and trade opportunities can generate 
mixed policy positions. On the one hand, Italy’s extraction and refining industries are 
among the more polluting ones in the developed world. At the same time, this sector has 
relatively little exposure to the international market, mostly because it is internally suf-
ficient, featuring small imports from foreign companies. This low trade exposure dilutes 
the otherwise presumably harsh opposition that high-CO2 Italian industries would have 
against international climate policy. 
 
5 See the Appendix for a more systematic definition of the variables. See also Genovese (2014; 2019) for 
more details on the data sources. 
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Figure 2. GHG Volume and Trade Openness of Agricultural Sectors. 
 
Note: The dot plots illustrate the cross-national distribution of (a) relative pollution burden (measured via sectoral GHG emis-
sions/total GHG emissions) and (b) log of trade openness (import and export exposure/GDP) for the agricultural sector (ISIC 
category A). The calculations for Italy are highlighted with the red arrow. 
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Figure 3. GHG Volume and Trade Openness of Mining and Extraction Sectors. 
 
Notes: The plots are equivalent to the ones in Figure 2 but for the mining and extraction sectors (ISIC category B). The calcula-
tions for Italy are highlighted with the red arrow. 
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This interpretation is corroborated by the historical position that Enel has taken on 
climate action. Italy’s most powerful natural gas lobby has played lip service to the cli-
mate cause, but has also been a significant user of coal, failing to set out an explicit plan 
for ending coal use. That said, Enel’s concern with international climate regulation 
seems small because much of its market is internal, so – given its historically monopo-
listic role in Italy – it fears little competition in the domestic market.6 Consequently, 
lobbying against international policy has not been a priority. 
The evidence presented here is obviously descriptive. Other factors may be at play: 
for example, the leadership of institutions (e.g. the EU) and the strategic preferences of 
parties involved in government may also affect the equilibrium of UNFCCC positions. 
That said, and in light of the critical role of economic actors expressed in the literature, 
the sector-level analysis at least suggests why Italy has not shown either noteworthy 
support or utter refusal of some of the mining-related decisions at the UNFCCC. Hence, 
the configuration of the environmental and trade dimensions for these crucial economic 
sectors seem to reasonably account for the neutral positions that Italy has regularly taken 
on international climate policy.  
3.2 Mixed preferences among the public 
The previous section showed evidence of how environmental ambition and economic 
(i.e., trade) opportunities can offset each other and therefore explain neutral preferences 
for international climate action. But I have also argued that these dynamics apply to 
other domestic drivers of international climate positions, in particular public opinion. 
In this section I investigate this with an analysis of climate policy preferences among the 
Italian public. 
The data I rely on here come straight from the Eurobarometer surveys. The 
Eurobarometer provides representative, individual-level responses to questions related 
to environmental policy, including preferences for climate policies in line with 
UNFCCC targets. To this end, the Eurobarometer has also fielded climate change-
specific questionnaires across Europe. For my purposes I focus specifically on the last 
two of these climate change surveys: the Special Eurobarometer 459 Wave EB87.1 (from 
2017) and the Special Eurobarometer 490 Wave EB91.3 (from 2019). 
These surveys ask a number of specific, forward-looking questions about climate 
action. They also include other questions, including – and relevant here – responses on 
political interest in the issue and information on individuals’ economic resources. 
Following my argument, the expectation is that, while political interest can increase 
interest in climate policy action, economic constraints would reduce it – hence resulting 
in conflicting pressures on opinion.  
I proceed with testing this conjecture on the Italian battery of the Eurobarometer 
data. Before moving to the test, however, it is worth demonstrating that, like the Italian 
government’s position at the UNFCCC, public opinion in Italy is indeed situated in a 
rather neutral position on climate policy. I show this by comparing the Italian and 
aggregate European responses to two specific questions highlighted in the surveys: one 
on the importance of the growth of renewables (‘How important do you think it is that the 
 
6 Fisher, LittleCott and Skillings. 2017. ‘Italy’s National Energy Strategy’. E3G Consultation Response. 
https://www.e3g.org/docs/Italian_Energy_Strategy_v3_EN_website.docx.pdf  
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[nationality] government sets targets to increase the amount of renewable energy used, 
such as wind or solar power, by 2030?’) and another question on household energy 
efficiency (‘How important do you think it is that the [nationality] government provides 
support for improving efficiency by 2030 (e.g. by encouraging people to insulate their 
homes or buy electric cars)?’). For both sets of answers, the outcome is spread over four 
categories, from ‘Not at all important’ to ‘Very important’.7 
Figure 4 shows that the Italian responses (averaged across the 2017 and 2019 
samples) are very close to the mean European response. To put the data in perspective, 
the majority of respondents in the Netherlands (>75%) and a minor part of respondents 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (<35%) think these issues are ‘very important’ for 
their governments to prioritize. Contrastingly, roughly one in two Italians consider 
these important. At the same time, more than one in ten Italians are either indifferent 
(‘Don’t Know’) or deem the issue not relevant. While the questions are by construction 
inducing a positive reaction (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003), the Italian position 
seems rather average -- i.e., mild -- by European standards.  
Do mixed concerns at the individual level help explain why the Italian public is 
moderate on climate policy issues? To get at the core of this hypothesis, I resort to a 
regression analysis in which I correlate the individual-level responses to the two 
questions above with two proxies. To get at environmental concern, I rely on a response 
to political interest, and use the Eurobarometer index that goes from 1 (not at all 
interested) to 4 (very interested). To get at economic concern, I rely on the response to 
the question ‘Have you had difficulties paying your bills at the end of the month?’, which 
goes from 1 (almost never/never) to 3 (often).8 In addition to these two variables, I enter 
in the regression equation a number of standard control variables, namely age, gender 
and education (measured in education years). I also add the individual’s type of 
occupation to control for motivations derived from the job (Bechtel, Genovese and 
Scheve 2019). The results are qualitatively equivalent if I use these models or more 
parsimonious specifications. The results are also robust to other specifications, e.g. a 
logit model (see Appendix). 
Table 1 reports the results of linear (OLS) models for each of the two responses. As 
expected, I find that the coefficients of the two relevant covariates are significant and go 
in opposite directions. Political interest is positively correlated with the importance that 
people give to increasing targets for clean energy and incentivizing environmental 
efficiency. At the same time and basically by the same magnitude, Italians who have 
greater financial difficulties are less likely to deem climate policy very important.  
 
7 In secondary analyses reported in the Appendix, I also explore to what extent respondents agree with 
the statements ‘Fighting climate change and using energy more efficiently can boost the economy and 
jobs in the EU’ [present only in EBS 459]; and ‘More public financial support should be given to the tran-
sition to clean energies even it means subsidies to fossil fuels should be reduced’ [present only in EBS 
490]. The results are consistent with the main analysis. 
8 I prefer the answer to the bills question rather than the classic ‘household income’ item, because house-
hold income is systematically underreported or missing. 
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Figure 4. Public opinion on climate policy issues: Italy versus Europe. 
 
 
 
Notes: The bar plots show the aggregate distribution of public positions on two issues related to climate policy: (a) renewable 
energy, and (b) energy efficiency. Data are averages from Eurobarometer surveys 87.1 (2017) and 91.3 (2019). 
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The results are externally relevant because Italy has a high rate of political 
mobilization, with electoral turnout historically well above 70%, but also substantial 
levels of poverty vis-à-vis other OECD countries. The direct implication is that the public 
in politically interested but financially constrained nations like Italy is substantially torn 
between political imaginary and economic incapabilities, and both seem to generate 
mild governmental positions on climate policy. More generally, the findings imply that 
it may not be a lack of salience but rather the offsetting effect of multidimensional 
concerns that explains mild positions on global affairs. As for domestic economic 
sectors, mixed pressures in national public opinion seem to explain ‘mild’ positions in 
international political issues.  
Table 1. The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate policies. 
 
Notes: Linear (OLS) estimation. The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed. 
4. Conclusions 
It is often assumed that few countries attach high relevance to issues discussed in 
international politics. Consequently, negotiations and decision-making in 
contemporary international relations are often depicted as a result of hegemony or key 
alliances, i.e. of actors assumed to attach more salience to their international issues. 
This thinking assumes that other countries do not have salience for these international 
issues, thereby often leaving a number of mid-sized countries like Italy understudied. 
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In contrast with this view, in this paper I argue that these understudied countries do, in 
fact, give importance to international issues; however, they may be driven to mild 
positions by mixed domestic incentives. Consequently, it is not the lack of intrinsic 
salience but the offsetting role of counterbalancing sources of national interest that 
dilute the international position of countries like Italy on issues such as international 
climate change action.  
To explore this argument, the paper investigates the domestic drivers of Italy’s 
position on international climate policy. I specifically focus on two political economy 
actors: industrial lobbies and public opinion. I maintain that ambition for 
environmental leadership and economic constraints due to limited financial resources 
have systematically counteracted each other for both these two fundamental sources of 
national positions. Observational data are put forward in support of the argument. 
Evidently, the research has limitations. The design is exploratory and the results are 
only correlational. The observations on industries’ concerns are novel yet constrained 
across time and only updated to 2011. The public opinion data, which is pertinent to 
more recent years and therefore does not overlap with the industry data, uses imperfect 
proxies to capture the variables of interest.  
Nonetheless, conditional on these caveats, the evidence suggests how Italy 
compares to other countries on international climate policy, and how lukewarm the 
Italian position has been in the past few years. The data also indicates that, in line with 
the argument, Italian businesses and voters are torn between the awareness and 
willingness to act on climate and the material burdens the issue imposes.  
Altogether, the paper offers some lessons on how to think about countries in inter-
national politics that are often assumed to pay little attention to global issues or to 
‘bandwagon’. The paper also gives some predictions on how positions on global public 
good issues may vary as some of the offsetting domestic concerns may relax or intensify. 
For example, Italy’s cooperation on climate change may strengthen if Italians become 
wealthier or if they suffer more from climate change-induced natural disasters. At the 
same time, and importantly for the post-COVID19 world, Italy may become less coop-
erative on international issues where its businesses face harsh terms from trade 
partners following a national recession. Future work may want to explore the merit of 
this argument on the false dichotomy between economic and environmental concerns 
in other fields. For example, at the onset of the COVID19 pandemic, similar dynamics 
may affect how governments position themselves between health protection and eco-
nomic growth.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variables definition and sources.  
Variable Source Definition 
1. Cross country industry analysis 
UNFCCC national positions 
(Figure 1)  
Genovese 2014 (see 
also Genovese 2019), 
based on UNFCCC 
National 
Communications. 
Empirical means calculated with a latent 
Bayesian factor analysis of manually 
coded national positions over 43 
UNFCCC issues. The distribution spans 
between -2 and +2 circa. 
GHG emissions of each 
sector (Figure 2 & 3) 
UNFCCC yearly country 
data averaged for 2001-
4 and 2009-11 (see 
also Genovese 2019) 
Greenhouse gas emission profiles 
summarized in million tons of CO2-
equivalent emissions for each UNFCCC 
member across six main IPCC sector 
groups (the paper focuses specifically 
on the agriculture and mining/extraction 
sector, but Genovese 2019 presents 
also the figures for manufacturing). The 
standardized value of sectoral emissions 
was calculated by the author by 
weighing (i.e. dividing) each sector’s 
emission by the total CO2-equivalent 
emissions of the country. The 
distribution is between 0 and 100. 
Trade openness for each 
sector (Figure 2 & 3) 
Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP), 
database 6 for 2001-04 
and database 7 for 
2009-11. 
The sum of exports and imports in USD 
prices divided by sectoral GDP (as 
coded in the value added of the World 
Development Indicators database). The 
data is logged (distribution between 
1 and 5) 
2. Public opinion analysis  
Salience of issues related to 
(a) renewable energy, and (b) 
energy efficiency (Figure 4; 
see exact question wording in 
the main text). 
Eurobarometer 459 
Wave EB87.1 (2017) 
and the Eurobarometer 
490 Wave EB91.3 
(2019). 
Four-category ordinal response, from 1 
(not at all important) to 4 (very 
important). ‘Don’t Know’ coded as 
missing. 
Political interest (Table 1) Eurobarometer surveys 
above 
Four-category ordinal response, from 1 
(not at all interested) to 4 (very 
interested). 
Difficulty in Paying Bills 
(Table 1) 
Eurobarometer surveys 
above 
Three-category ordinal response, from 1 
(almost never/never) to 3 (often). 
Notes: the empirical material presented in the paper is drawn from different sources. In the table I clarify the definition and sources 
for the main variables in cross-country industry analysis (part 1), and then for those in the public opinion analysis (part 2). 
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Table A2. The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate poli-
cies: wave-specific regressions of responses to renewables growth question. 
 
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation. The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed. 
Table A3. The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate poli-
cies: wave-specific regressions of responses to household efficiency question. 
 
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation. The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed. 
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Table A4. The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate poli-
cies: alternative question (EB87.1). 
 
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation. The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed. 
Table A5. The effect of political interest and economic constraints on public opinion on climate poli-
cies: alternative question (EB91.3). 
 
Notes: linear (OLS) estimation. The reference category for the ‘Occupation’ variable is Unemployed. 
